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The Effect of Intragroup Communication on 
Preference Shifts in Groups
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We use a laboratory gift-exchange game to examine decisions made by groups under three 
different procedures that dictate how group members interact and reach decisions in 
comparison to individuals acting alone. We find that group decisions do deviate from those of 
individuals, but the direction and magnitude of gift exchange depend critically on the 
procedure. This suggests that no general statements can be made concerning the propensity 
of groups to exhibit reciprocal or other-regarding behavior relative to individuals. The rules 
governing how group members can express their preferences and expectations to other 
group members are critical for determining group outcomes. 
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How  are  individual  preferences  for  giving  charitable  donations  or  retirement  planning 
strategies integrated by married couples?  How are preferences for risk combined by members 
of business management teams and corporate boards?  The recent growth in the economics 
literature on group or team decision making has been motivated by the recognition of many 
instances like these where individuals make a decision as part of a group and the decision-
making process may not equally aggregate the preferences of the constituent individuals.   
Understanding differences between group and individual behavior has been greatly 
illuminated by a number of recent studies in both the laboratory and field, but important 
questions  remain.    There  is  convincing  evidence  that  groups  outperform  individuals  at 
cognitive tasks.  A majority of studies on social preferences have found that groups act with 
greater self-interest and are more rational, but there are exceptions.  What is less clear is what 
mechanism causes group decisions to deviate from those of individuals, which is critical for 
using  laboratory  results  to  understand  real  world  behavior.    The  two  most  commonly 
proposed explanations, group identity and social comparison, predict that groups will deviate 
from individuals in opposite directions.   
Another factor that has received limited attention that we focus on is the procedure 
that governs how the group functions.  Specifically, the extent of intragroup communication 
and the allocation of decision-making authority.  Some groups deliberate extensively and use 
a fairly egalitarian framework, such as in caucuses in political elections.  In other settings 
groups are hierarchical and may involve little interaction among constituent members.  In 
business  group  procedures  vary  in  important  ways  across  cultures.    In  Japan,  business 
traditions  dictate  that  the  team  must  achieve  a  consensus  among  all  members  to  reach  a 
decision, while a comparatively hierarchical structure is more common in the West (Gerlach,   2
1997).  As we show later, these differences can be exploited to understand how groups reach 
decisions.   
In this study we contribute to the literature on groups by using an experimental design 
that subtly varies group procedure across treatments to i) assess the robustness of previous 
findings  by  looking  at  whether  group  decisions  deviate  from  individual  decisions  in  a 
consistent  direction,  and  ii)  to  test  the  explanatory  power  of  competing  models  of  group 
decision making to better understand why a difference exists.  We use the gift exchange game, 
first described by Fehr, et. al. (1993), that is based on an experimental labor market where 
employers offer wages to employees who can subsequently exert costly effort that benefits the 
employer.    Because  effort  is  not  third-party  enforced,  a  purely  self-interested  employee 
always supplies minimal effort in a one-shot game.  A particularly appealing aspect of the gift 
exchange game is that the intensity of social preferences can be measured by estimating a 
single parameter, namely, the correlation between effort and wage.
1  It also develops a richer 
contextual setting than more abstract designs like the trust or dictator game which better suits 
our focus on the role of institutions and norms on group interaction.   
Our  main  conclusion  is  that  rules  governing  how  individuals  can  exert  their 
preferences in the formation of group decisions is crucial for determining group outcomes.  
Specifically,  the  rules  that  determine  the  distribution  of  decision  making  authority  and 
influence across group members can profoundly alter the degree of gift exchange exhibited by 
the team as a whole.  In one treatment where teammates have equal power to influence the 
group  decision,  less  gift  exchange  (relative  to  individuals)  was  observed.    In  a  second 
                                                 
1  Charness  (2004)  has  shown  that  a  positive  correlation  is  indicative  of  the  existence  of  general  social 
preferences (either distributional or reciprocity based). Charness also suggests that when wages are sufficiently 
low  so  as  to  ensure  that  employees  always  fare  poorly  relative  to  employers,  concern  withdrawal  can  be 
triggered where the employee withdraws his willingness to sacrifice to help the employer.     3
treatment  where  one  team  member  was  assigned  the  role  of  “decision  maker”  and  her 
teammate can only make suggestions, the team exhibited significantly stronger gift exchange 
than individuals.  Finally, in a treatment where one member is an authoritarian decision maker 
and her teammate is completely passive, there is no significant difference in the amount of 
gift exchange observed between teams and individuals.  These results suggests that no general 
conclusions can be made about the propensity of teams to exhibit more or less other-regarding 
behavior  relative  to  individuals.      However,  it  also  suggests  that  the  design  of  rules  that 
govern  interactions  between  group  members  can  have  nontrivial  impacts  on  overall  team 
objectives  and  social  outcomes.    For  instance,  in  competitive  situations  where  a  team  is 
seeking a competitive advantage over other teams, the team may want to design rules that 
maximize the wealth or profit of one’s own team without regard to other teams.  On the other 
hand, when groups come together for charitable causes or to cooperate on social or public 
goods, it may be beneficial for groups to adopt rules which would facilitate greater pro-social 
behavior across groups. 
Previous research on group decision making can generally be categorized into two 
classifications.    One  strand  focuses  on  the  cognitive  ability  of  groups  to  solve  economic 
problems  where  there  are  universally  optimal  answers.    The  focus  is  on  whether  groups 
outperform individuals at tasks such as solving puzzles, processing complicated information, 
and  avoiding  mistakes  as,  for  example,  a  proxy  for  viability  under  the  pressures  of  a 
competitive market.  Results have repeatedly found that groups do better (Cooper and Kagel, 
2005; Blinder and Morgan, 2005; Sutter, 2004).  Another strand of research compares group 
and individual preferences involving decisions such as risk or self-interest, where the optimal 
response is subjective.  Theoretical studies have shown that group decisions deviate from   4
those of individuals implying that modeling groups as if they were individuals could result in 
biased predictions (e.g. Eliaz et al., 2006; Sobel, 2006)
 2.  Empirically, Charness, Rigotti, and 
Rustichini (2007) use experiments to show that individuals who are members of a group and 
identify with the group behave differently in strategic environments than individuals who do 
not identify with a group.  While our paper also uses experiments to examine the relevance of 
groups, it differs from CRR in that we focus on the group decision that emerges from teams of 
individuals interacting, whereas CRR focuses on how group identity and saliency affects the 
choices made by individuals.   
With regard to teams and social preferences, previous economic studies that focus on 
groups and other regarding behavior include Cason and Mui (1997); Bornstein and Yaniv 
(1998); Cox (2002); Kocher and Sutter (2007); Luhan et al. (2007); and Kugler et al., (2006).  
While Cason and Mui found groups to act less in accordance with pure self-interest than 
individuals, the other studies mentioned found the opposite.  Our study bridges this gap in 
research  conclusions  in  the  finding  that  the  procedure  governing  group  interaction  can 
profoundly  impact  results.    While  our  study  adds  to  previous  literature  to  further  reveal 
whether  groups  act  with  greater  self-interest  than  individuals  our  experimental  design 
provides an examination of possible explanations for why a difference may exist.  While the 
term group, or team, has been used generally to refer to a collection of a small number of 
individuals given the task of making a representative decision there is a great deal of variation 
in the procedures that govern how individuals within the group interact
3.  This is likely to be 
less  important  in studies  on  cognition  where  it  is  prudent  to  assume that  all  subjects  are 
                                                 
2 Eliaz et al. demonstrate that choice shifts in groups represent a failure of expected utility that is equivalent to 
Allais Paradox.  Sobel focuses on the aggregation of information in groups when individuals receive independent 
signals about the state of the world.      
3 We only consider externally dictated procedures rather than those that may arise endogenously.     5
working towards the same end of finding the correct solution.  In preference focused contexts 
things are more complicated.  A natural conflict exists when individuals in a group have 
diverse preferences and are thus driven to seek different outcomes.  How they consciously and 
otherwise influence and are influenced by others in their group depends critically on the group 
procedure.   
We  break  procedure  down  into  two  stages
4.    First  is  the  deliberation  phase  that 
characterizes how group members are able to convey information about their preferences to 
others and engage in any persuasive efforts.  Both of these factors have been considered as 
potentially important aspects of group decision-making in previous research both in social 
psychology and economics (Isenberg, 1986; and Luhan, 2007).   Common approaches in the 
lab include face-to-face interaction and text over computer.  Our study looks at the influence 
of  preference  revelation  by  gradually  varying  the  amount  of  information  subjects  receive 
about their partner’s preferences across the group treatments.  While verbal discussion is an 
important part of how groups make decisions in the real world we eliminate it here to more 
cleanly reveal the interaction between the preferences of subjects and their pair members.  
This provides a foundation for interpreting decisions made in environments that allow more 
extensive interaction.   
The second element is the decision phase which considers the importance of the rule 
that dictates how the group is to reach a decision.  A useful way to consider the set of possible 
decision  rules  is  on  a  hierarchy  continuum  from  egalitarian,  where  the  decision  requires 
unanimous  approval,  to  authoritarian,  where  a  subset  of  the  group  is  assigned  complete 
control.    Decision  rules  have  been  shown  to  influence  group  decisions  in  the  social 
                                                 
4 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list.  For instance, important differences may exist between endogenously 
versus exogenously formed groups.  In this case,  how groups form would be an important element of procedure.    6
psychology and organizational behavior literature (Allison et al., 1996)
5.  While economic 
studies  have  used  a  variety  of  approaches  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  its  importance  by 
comparing  across  studies.    This  element  of  our  experimental  design  is  important  for 
understanding whether variation in the findings of previous studies on groups in economics is 
partially  a  result  of  using  different  decision  rules.    The  extremes  of  the  continuum  are 
explored in this study where two of the group treatments are purely authoritarian while the 
third requires consent from both pair members.   
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section II describes the experimental design 
in  detail  demonstrating  how  group  procedure  is  varied  to  generate  testable  hypotheses.  
Section III provides results and analysis.  Section IV provides a discussion of how the design 
of this study and its findings fit into the larger literature on group research and considers 
future research.   
            
I.  Experimental Design 
All  parts  of  the  experiment  were  programmed  and  conducted  with  the  software  z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007).  Students were recruited via email for a ‘Paying Economics Experiment’ 
explaining that they would interact with other students in a simulated market, and that their 
take home pay would depend on decisions made by themselves and others in their session.  
They were told that the experiment would take just over an hour, and that the average pay 
would be about $17.  The initial response rate from the first email was approximately 10%.  
Interested students were sent more information and were assigned to specific sessions that 
                                                 
5 Allison et al. contend that the decision rule is not only important for understanding the group decision, but also 
should influence the decision of the party transacting with the group if they know what decision rule is being 
used.  Using the ultimatum game they find that individuals trading with groups unwisely ignore this factor.     7
took place on weekday evenings.  While recruited students were from a variety of majors 
nearly the entire subject population had a minimum of one course in economics
6.   
Subjects sat at networked laptop computers that were placed approximately three feet 
apart.    Cardboard  barriers  surrounded  each  station  to  provide  anonymity  while  making 
decisions.  All instructions were read allowed  to the subjects who followed along with a 
hardcopy.  They were informed that their pay would be based on a combination of a show up 
fee, and their accumulated point total from the gift-exchange game.  It is also emphasized 
before the start of the session that they would be paid in private at the end of the session.  In 
the gift-exchange game the first-movers earned on average a bit less than a dollar per trade.  
The second movers earned about twice as much.  Informed consent from each student was 
obtained before taking part in the session as required by the university’s Institutional Review 
Board.   
The form of the gift-exchange game used in this study most closely follows Charness 
and Haruvy (2004) where second-movers cannot reject their wage offer and all wage offers 
are  private.
7    The  remainder  of  the  game  structure  follows  the  typical  form  of  the  gift-
exchange game found in Fehr (1998).  In a trading period, managers are given 100 points and 
they choose to give a wage  {0,1,....,99,100} w∈  to the employee.  After being informed of 
                                                 
6 While there is currently a debate about whether experimental results are driven by the relative presence of 
students that have taken economics, see Fehr et al. (2006) and Engelmann and Strobel (2006), this is of less 
concern in our study since we are looking at relative changes between treatments, and subject pools across all 
treatments  and  sessions  predominately  consisted  of  students  who  had  at  a  minimum  taken  introductory 
economics.   
7 In other designs of the game a continuous time market is created where firms offer wages that are accepted by a 
pool  of  workers.    It  was  not  possible  to  implement  this  design  here  because  of  the  group  communication 
structure used where groups can only communicate by proposing choices to their group member that either can 
accept.  Also, Charness and Haruvy (2004) review gift-exchange experiments and show that public posting does 
not seem to affect results.     8
their wage, employees decide on effort or quantity of work,  {0.1,0.2,...,0.9,1} q∈ , which has 
an associated cost function, ( ) c q
8.  This cost function is given by the schedule shown below.   
 
Schedule of quantity of work and cost 
q  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
c(q)  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
 
After quantity of work is determined, the managers income for the period is calculated 
as MI = (100-w)q.  Income for the employees is EI = w-c(q).  Note that in the team treatments, 
the “manager” is actually a team of two subjects who jointly determine a wage.  Similarly, the 
“employee” is a team of two subjects who jointly determine an effort level to supply to the 
management team after observing their wage offer.  The way that teams determine wage and 
effort depend on the team treatment described below. 
Given the sequential nature of the game, it is straightforward to show, using backward 
induction, that if all subjects were purely self interested, the Nash equilibrium outcome is w = 
0 and q = 0.1.  This equilibrium yields an income of 10 for the manager and an income of 0 
for the employee.  Note that the largest achievable social surplus is 100 points, which would 
be obtained if q = .1 and w = 100.
9  Subjects taking part in the group treatment are told that 
each member receives the total point amount from each transaction.  In other words, it is not 
split between them.  If their group earns 20 points they each receive this amount, not 10.   
                                                 
8 Both ‘quantity of work’ and ‘effort’ are used in gift exchange experiments to describe the employees decision 
variable.  Our instructions use the prior in the experiments, but we commonly use effort in this discussion for 
brevity.    
9 This result is unlikely since it requires a manager that is purely motivated by social efficiency preferences 
given that they know with certainty that they will accrue 0 points.     9
Before  the  start  of  the  game  all  subjects  perform  a  set  of  practice  calculations  to 
determine  manager  and  employee  pay  under  a  range  of  possible  wage  and  effort 
combinations.  Each subject is also informed whether she was assigned the role of manager or 
employer, and that she will participate in five identical periods of the gift exchange game, 
where in each period, she will trade with a different subject on the other side of the market.  
For example, if she is an employee, she will be randomly rematched with another manager at 
the beginning of each period.  This random rematching rules out repeated game effects.  For 
the two team treatments where one team member is assigned decision making authority (AN 
and AC) subjects are informed of which role they have been assigned to.   
We now provide the details of our treatments, which includes an individual treatment, 
which serves as a baseline for comparison, along with three team treatments.  A detailed 
description of the individual and three group treatments is provided below.   
 
Treatment 1: Individual Treatment (IN) 
The individual treatment serves as the baseline treatment where individual managers trade 
with individual employees.  In this regard, it is very similar to most gift-change experiments 
found in the literature.   
 
Treatment 2: Asymmetric No Communication Team Treatment (AN) 
The AN treatment is our first team treatment.  A team is comprised of two subjects that are on 
the same side of the market.  For example, a manager team is a team of two subjects that were 
assigned to the role of manager.  An employee team is a team of two subjects assigned the 
role of employee.   In each team, one member is assigned the role of “Decider” and the other   10
subject is simply a silent partner who observes passively.   All subjects are told what role 
(manager or employee) they are assigned to before reading the instructions and that they will 
keep the same role throughout all five periods.  They are also told that their pair member 
changes after every period.  Deciders are told that they are paired with another person and will 
be making  a decision on behalf of their team.   They  also know that  manager teams and 
employee teams have the same procedure for arriving at a decision.  The silent partners in 
both the manager and employee teams are informed of all relevant wage and effort decisions 
made by their Decider partners.  Thus, the Deciders know that their partners will be informed 
of their decision.  Also, there are no time limits on any decisions.   
For both treatment AN and AC (described below) there is limited within and between 
group rematching.  Looking first at within group pairings, recall that 6 subjects are assigned to 
be managers and 6 are employees.  Subjects keep the same role over the five periods, so the 
three dictators are paired with all three non-dictators once, and two out of three twice.  The 
same holds for between group pairings.  The three management dictators are paired with each 
of the three employee dictators once, and two out of three twice.  While this does introduce 
the possibility of strategic action resulting from repeated interaction the potential for this is 
limited by not identifying with whom one is paired or trading with.   
The AN treatment was designed to determine whether group choices can deviate from 
individual  choices  purely  as  a  function  of  group  identity,  as  was  looked  at  in  CRR.  
Confounding  factors  created  by  the  communication  of  expectations  are  minimized  by 
eliminating  interaction  between  partners  and  assigning  complete  authority  to  one  person.  
Thus,  of  our  three  treatments,  AN  involves  the  least  amount  of  interaction  between 
teammates.  To use terminology from CRR, compared to the other two team treatments the   11
groupings  in  AN  are  the  least  salient
10.    The  strongest  potential  influence  of  group 
membership  results  from  the  authoritarian  group  member  knowing  that  their  partner  is 
informed  of  their  decision.    Note  that  given  that  teammates  are  randomly  assigned  and 
determined purely by an act of chance, team identity can be construed as an illusion and we 
would anticipate that team identity should have minimal influence.  Nonetheless, minimal 
group ties assumptions are often motivated by  the psychological theory of social identity 
theory, which assumes that people’s self identity is partly tied to perceived membership or ties 
to a group.
11  Previous research in social psychology has shown that even when people are 
randomly assigned to groups, they tend to discriminate in favor of group members (Billig and 
Tajfel, 1973).   
  
Treatment 3: Asymmetric Communication Team Treatment (AC) 
The AC treatment only varies the deliberation phase relative to AN.  The difference is that the 
non-Decider is able to communicate his preferred decision to the Decider before the Decider 
chooses  the  team  decision.    The  Decider,  after  observing  the  preferred  decision  of  her 
teammate, then decides the actual wage or effort depending whether it is a manager team or 
employee team.  For example, in the case of an employee team, both team members are 
informed of the wage the team received from the manager team and then the non-Decider 
suggests an effort.  The Decider then decides the actual effort provided by her team.  This 
treatment permits a limited degree of communication between teammates.  That is, before the 
Decider chooses, she learns about her teammates preferences.  For information on within and 
                                                 
10 One way that CRR vary saliency is by altering whether the non-decision making team member is present to 
observe their teammates decision.   
11 See Haslam (2001) for a discussion of this theory.   12
between rematching in AC refer to the second paragraph in the above section on treatment 
AN.   
 
Treatment 4: Bilateral/Unrestricted Communication Team Treatment (BG) 
The BG treatment varies both the deliberation and decision phases relative to AN and AC.  
Each  team  member  in  the  manager  and  employee  teams  have  equal  decision-making 
authority, and communication of desired decisions is much less restricted than in AC.  The 
two  team  members  in  a  pairing  are  given  three  minutes  to  negotiate  an  agreement  on  a 
decision.    In  negotiating  a  decision,  each  member  is  limited  to  offering  a  wage  proposal 
(managers) or an effort proposal (employees) to her teammate by typing in the number they 
want.  Both group members can offer as many proposals as desired and either team member 
can make the first offer during the negotiation period.  The negotiation stage ends either when 
one of the offers is accepted or after 180 seconds.  Each person sees all the previous offers 
they have made in the same negotiation stage, and all the offers their partner made in the same 
negotiation  stage.    If  there  is  no  agreement  after  180  seconds  both  subjects  on  the  team 
receive a payout of zero for that period.  If this happens for the managers a wage of 0 is 
assigned to the employee team while minimum effort is supplied for employees if no decision 
is reached.  During the actual experiments the average time to reach a decision for employees 
was 37 seconds, and only one pair went down to the final 5 seconds.  Managers took more 
time on average to reach agreements, and one pair failed to do so within the time limit.  
This form of group interaction has a number of attractive qualities.  First, it eliminates 
a number of confounds that are created by text based discussion or face-to-face interaction 
which allow subjects to provide arguments.  Factors including gender, race, physical stature,   13
speaking volume, and fluency with English could all affect written, spoken, or face-to-face 
negotiations.  While each may play a key role in real world scenarios these factors are not the 
focus of this research.  While restricting communication, subjects can transmit to their partner 
some level of preference intensity by repeatedly making the offer or by refusing to accept a 
partner’s offer.   
A  second  advantage  of  the  communication  format  is  that  it  allows  for  a  detailed 
analysis of the group negotiation process.  Analyses can thus be made about who made an 
offer, who accepted an offer, how many offers where made, and when they were made.  It 
also reveals whether subjects with certain types of preferences tend to be more active in 
negotiations.  An example of an actual employee group negotiation is shown in Figure 1.  
Again, this approach sacrifices written or spoken communication in order to gain detailed 
information about the negotiation process while minimizing subjective interpretation.   
 
Group theories and Hypotheses 
While economists have just recently begun to study group preferences and decision making, 
social  psychologists  have  generated  a  significant  amount  of  research  on  group  decision-
making in the last forty years.  Their primary finding though that group decisions tend toward 
extremes relative to individual decisions, a phenomenon referred to as group polarization first 
discovered  by  Stoner  (1961),  was  clearly  of  potential  interest  to  economists
12.    The  first 
economic  study  of  group  preferences  was  Cason  and  Mui  (1997),  which  focused  on 
integrating  concepts  from  social  psychology  into  economics,  and  to  test  two  competing 
theories  of  group  decision-making,  Social  Comparison  Theory  (SCT)  and  Persuasive 
                                                 
12  Isenberg  (1986)  provides  a  summary  and  meta-analysis  of  the  social  psychology  literature  on  group 
polarization.    14
Argumentation  Theory  (PAT),  using  the  dictator  game.    They  find  that  other-regarding 
behavior is accentuated in groups as individuals seek to represent their preferences as being 
less self-regarding
13.  According to Social Comparison Theory (SCT)  people seek to display 
their  preferences  as  being  more  extreme  than  average  in  the  direction  deemed  preferable 
according to social norms.  For example, among business students risk taking is considered to 
be an attractive trait, so a contest develops to present oneself as more of a risk taker than 
others.  The result is that the group decision is less risk averse than would have resulted from 
each individual anonymously making decisions alone.   
The results in Cason and Mui (1997) have been contradicted by more recent studies 
that have found that groups seem to act more strategically with less concern for the payoff of 
others; in other words, groups act in a manner more consistent with narrow self-interest.  In 
ultimatum games groups play closer to game theoretic predictions by offering and accepting 
less equal splits (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998).  Cox (2002) found groups returning less money 
in trust games (another continuous form of response game) than individuals.  In the study 
most related to this one, Kocher and Sutter (2007) also compare individual and group play in 
the  gift  exchange  game.
14    While  they  do  find  groups  acting  in  greater  accordance  with 
narrow self-interest in a treatment where individuals in three person groups vote, this finding 
is less strong in a face-to-face treatment.  No significant difference between individuals and 
groups is found in terms of gift exchange.  It has also been shown that groups differ from 
individuals in their level of trust in experiments with non-enforceable exchange.  Kugler et al. 
                                                 
13 Cason and Mui (1997) base their argument that other-regarding preferences are more socially acceptable on 
the  standard  finding  that  a  large  percentage  of  the  population  sacrifices  to  improve  the  pay  of  others  in 
experimental designs such as the dictator and ultimatum games.   
14 While they also have one treatment that employs computerized interaction to track group decision-making 
dynamics, it is based on a discrete proposal and voting scheme that differs from the continuous time dynamic 
format used in this study.      15
(2006) find that groups transfer less money in the first stage of a trust game and expect less in 
return, although they return just as much money as individuals in the responding role.     
One explanation for  group behavior that has  come out of field experiments is the 
importance  of  group  identity.    These  studies  look  at  how  imagining  oneself  as  part  of  a 
defined group may impact behavior as a result of focusing more on those within one’s group 
relative to those outside.  The logic is that a person that is willing to sacrifice their own pay to 
improve  that  of  another  person  is  unwilling  to  do  so  when  this  sacrifice  also  applies  to 
someone inside their group to the betterment of an outsider.  Goette et al. (2006) examined 
other-regarding behavior among soldiers for those in their temporarily formed platoon relative 
to soldiers outside their platoon.  Even though the groups were temporary with no future, 
soldiers quickly formed a group identity and showed strong preferences for those inside their 
group relative to those outside.  Solow and Kirkwood (2002) found that in some cases being 
part  of  a  pre-existing  group  could  increase  contributions  to  public  goods,  results  varied 
depending  on  a  number  of  factors.    In  particular,  in  most  settings  group  formation  is 
endogenous  meaning  that  certain  types  of  groups  are  likely  to  attract  particular  types  of 
individuals.  The impact of this type of selection is likely just as critical to group decisions as 
general group processes are, and it has received limited study to date.  The strength of group 
identity in contexts including sports teams, military units, corporate identity, or branding is 
likely to be the subject of many future studies.     
It appears that most existing theories on group and team behavior predict that group 
decisions will deviate from individual choices.  Thus, our main hypothesis is that the level of 
gift-exchange observed in treatment IN will differ from the level of gift exchange observed in 
the team treatments AN, AC, or BG.   16
However, there is significantly less consensus concerning the direction and magnitude 
of the deviation.  Group polarization combined with social comparison theory suggest that 
groups  may  cause  other  regarding  behavior  to  be  accentuated  in  a  direction  deemed 
acceptable to social norms and expectations.  The importance of social expectations seems to 
be confirmed by a paper by Dana et al. (2006) examining people’s willingness to contribute in 
dictator games where social expectations can be manipulated.  The authors suggest that much 
of what appears to be altruistic or other-regarding behavior can be confounded with attempts 
to satisfy social expectations of pro-social behavior.  If this strand of theory is correct, then we 
would  anticipate  that  there  could  be  more  gift  exchange  in  AN,  AC,  or  BG  than  in  IN.  
Moreover, we would also expect differences in the level of gift exchange observed across the 
three team treatments as they differ in the degree to which teammates can communicate their 
expectations to each other.  On the other hand, group identity theory would predict that people 
will  be  more  loyal  to  team  members  than  outsiders.    Thus,  if  our  subjects  have  social 
preferences, we would anticipate that they would have a stronger propensity to express these 
preferences toward teammates rather than the other team.   Thus, we would expect “team” 
decisions to exhibit less gift exchange than individual decisions.  While existing theories do 
not provide us with a clear prediction about the direction of gift exchange in teams relative to 
individuals, these theories may aid us with the interpretation of our results later. 
  
II.  Results 
The experiment was performed with students enrolled on the main campus of Ohio State 
University in Columbus, OH from October, 2006 to July, 2007.  Subjects were randomly 
assigned to specific roles within the experiment, and kept the same role throughout.  Twelve   17
subjects took part in each session, and a total of 13 sessions were run.  There were three 
sessions of IN, AN, and AC, along with four of BG.  Since there are five rounds, a total of 30 
wage and effort choices are made in each session for IN, while there are 15 for all the group 
treatments.  For the total sample, there are 237 unique wage/effort contracts.
15   
Trends in average wage and effort across treatments and periods are shown in Table 1.  
Wages were higher in BG (41) and AC (42) than in AN (33) and IN (38).  IN, BG, and AN 
were all similar in distribution around the mean with a standard deviation of about 23, as 
opposed to the more tightly grouped wages in AC where the standard deviation was 15.  Mean 
effort for IN was 0.23 compared to 0.26 for AN, 0.36 for AC, and 0.23 for BG.  Minimum 
effort was more than twice as frequent in BG (60%) than in AC (26%).  IN was a slightly 
lower than BG at 56%, and lower yet in AN at 31%.   
Figure 2 breaks down effort at different points in the wage schedule to provide some 
insight into mean effort across the treatments conditional on wage.  AC stands out with higher 
effort choices in each wage range greater than 10 while effort was lower at high wages in BG.   
A notable exception in AC compared to the other treatments is that no managers ever assigned 
a wage of less than 10.  The significance of w=10 is that when wages are lower than this 
cutoff point, it ensures that employees always fare poorly relative to employers.  If employees 
consider these excessively low wages as unfair, it could trigger concern withdrawal (Charness 
and  Rabin  2002)  where  the  employee  withdraws  his  willingness  to  sacrifice  to  help  the 
employer.   
Looking at the frequency of low wages, 23% percent of wages in the IN treatment 
were 10 or below.  In the BG treatment 19% were in this range.  This percentage drops to 4% 
                                                 
15 Three observations were lost in BG due to a minor computer failure in the final period of one session.     18
(2 out of 45) in the AC treatment (it was equal to 10 in both cases).   There is also significant 
variation in the frequency of high wages across treatments.  In IN 32% of wage offers were 
above 50, while just under half were in BG (47%).  AC was in between IN and BG at 36%, 
while AN was the lowest at 25%.  Managers in the BG treatment appeared much more likely 
to offer high wages than those in the other treatments.  It also seems that AC and AN differ 
from IN and BG in the lack of variance in wage offers.  Very few observations are in the 
extreme low or high ends of the range in the group treatments with asymmetric power. 
  The average total surplus per contract per round was highest in the AC treatment at 56 
points.  It is followed by BG at 52, AN at 49.4, and IN at 46.3.  If all subjects employed the 
Nash equilibrium strategy where wage is 0 and work is 0.1, income would be 10 for managers 
and 0 for employees.  It appears that managers maintained higher levels of gift exchange by 
avoiding  the  very  low  wages  that  were  common  in  IN  and  BG.    Employees  in  AC  also 
contributed to this by not deviating to minimum effort in round 1 and 2.  Employees did earn 
fewer points on average in AC as a result of this, although the increase in managers points 
more than made up for it from a social surplus standpoint.       
Pooling all the treatments, there is a downward trend in effort from period 1 to 5.  The 
mean effort levels of the pooled sample by period were 0.35, 0.25, 0.26, 0.22, and 0.20.  The 
mean wage for the entire sample for periods 1 through 5 was 45, 42, 41, 32, and 30.  Figures 3 
and 4 show the trend in mean wage and effort broken down by treatment and period.  Also 
shown in Table 1, there is a clear downward trend in the pooled sample.   
 
Regression Analysis   19
In order to assess the level of gift exchange observed in our experiments, we follow many 
previous studies of gift exchange by using a two-sided censored regression of the form:  
(1)  q w α β = +  
where the coefficient β represents the level of gift exchanges.  Gift exchange exists if β is 
strictly positive as it implies that increases in wages will induce employees to supply more 
effort even though employees are not obligated to do so.  Moreover, given that there is a 
downward trend in effort and wage, we include period and period-squared time trends in the 
regression.  Moreover, because there are repeated observations for each subject, we also use 
random effects to  estimate β.
16    In the  IN, AN, and  AC treatments this simply  requires 
accounting for unobserved individual specific effects through a panel data model.  In BG 
there are two individuals actively making one choice.  Since the pairs change every round it is 
not  possible  to  have  group  specific  effects.    Using  individual  specific  effects  requires 
including  the  wage  and  effort  decision  for  each  team  member.    Finally,  we  include  an 
interaction term between the wage variable and a team treatment dummy.  We specify a 
separate team treatment dummy for AN, AC and BG.  We point out that we do not pool all 
team  data  together;  instead,  we  conduct  the  same  analysis  for  each  of  the  three  team 
treatments. Thus, we run three separate regressions of the form, 
(2) 
2
1 2 1 2 q w TD wTD P P α β β θ ρ ρ = + + + + +  
where TD is a dummy variable for either AN, AC, or BG; and P is a period trend variable.  
Note  that  θ    represents  the  difference  in  the  level  of  gift  exchange  between  teams  and 
individuals and is the key parameter of interest.   
                                                 
16 This was implemented using the xtintreg command in STATA.     20
Table 2 provides a comparison of gift-exchange in all the group treatments compared 
to the individuals.  These results provide a test of our main hypothesis which is that team gift 
exchange will differ  from individual gift exchange.    Before comparing the various team 
treatments to the individual (IN) results, note that gift exchange was observed by individuals.  
The estimate of  1 β  is 0.01 and significant at the 1% level of significance.  Moreover, the 
magnitude  of  gift  exchange  is  in  the  same  neighborhood  as  what  was  found  in  previous 
studies (e.g. Charness 2004).   
We first compare the level of gift exchange observed in the AN team treatment to the 
level of gift exchange observed by individuals.  Recall that AN involves an authoritarian 
decision maker with a completely passive teammate.  Note here that, from a decision making 
perspective, the decision maker (henceforth, Decider) is essentially acting alone as if he were 
an  individual.    However,  because  the  Decider  was  assigned  a  teammate,  this  raises  the 
possibility  that  the  group  identity  effect  might  still  affect  behavior.    If  this  effect  is 
behaviorally irrelevant, then we ought to observe an estimate of θ that is not significantly 
different from zero.  The estimated coefficient is in fact -0.0015 and not significantly different 
from  zero.    Thus,  it  appears  that  association  with  a  team  did  not  lead  to  any  significant 
differences in gift exchange in our experiments
17.   
We now examine team results from AC.  Recall that in this team treatment, a Decider 
still  makes  the  decision  but  now  her  partner  (henceforth  Proposer)  can  communicate  his 
preferred choice to the Decider before the Decider chooses effort.  It turns out that allowing 
for one way communication has a large, positive, and significant impact on the level of gift 
                                                 
17 A possible treatment that lies between IN and AN would have been one where the silent partner is only 
informed of their point total but not of the specific wage and effort choices.   This would have controlled for 
whether the Decider was sensitive to beliefs about the expectations of their partner.  The fact that there was no 
difference between IN and AN makes this treatment less interesting.      21
exchange observed.  The estimate of θ  is 0.005 and significant at the 1% level.  Thus, the 
level of gift exchange exhibited by AC teams is dramatically higher than the level exhibited 
by individuals.  Moreover, the sum of the coefficients for wage and the wage/TD interaction 
term gives us the estimated size of gift exchange by AC employee teams.  This estimated sum 
turned out to be 0.015 and significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance.  
To put this into perspective, gift exchange of 0.015 is 50% higher than what we estimated for 
individuals at 0.01.   
Given the powerful effect that one way communication of effort appears to have, it 
would be interesting to closely examine the data on effort proposals by the Proposers in our 
AC sessions.  We conducted a regression replacing q in (2) with preferred q by Proposers.  
Moreover, the TD dummy for AC and the interaction term were dropped because data on 
proposed effort is relevant only for the AC sessions.  This regression yielded an estimate of 
gift exchange to be 0.0013 and not significantly different from zero (p=0.38).   Hence, it 
appears that proposed effort is much less responsive to wages than the actual effort chosen by 
Deciders.  The fact that Deciders exhibited a comparatively high amount of gift exchange 
whereas Proposers exhibited no gift exchange is somewhat of a puzzle.  Examining the raw 
data might offer some explanations.  First, average proposed effort is 0.38 which is very close 
to the actual effort chosen by Deciders (0.36).  Note from Table 1 that the average effort of 
0.36 is significantly higher than average effort from any other treatment.  Thus, it is not out of 
the realm of possibility that the generosity exhibited by Deciders in AC is partially influenced 
by the generous effort proposals of the Proposers.   Second, shown in the last row of Table 1, 
the percentage of trades for which employees chose the minimal effort of 0.1 is by far the 
lowest in AC.  Only 31% of AC employee teams exerted minimal effort, whereas no less than   22
50% of employees in other treatments exerted minimal effort.  Deciders also may have been 
influenced by the generosity of Proposers as only 27% of proposed effort were minimal.  In 
sum, while proposed effort in AC appears to be non-responsive to wages so that there is very 
little apparent gift exchange, the proposals are nonetheless very generous.  This generosity 
perhaps gave Deciders “permission” to also behave generously toward their managers.  The 
main difference is that Proposers appeared to be unconditionally generous whereas Deciders 
were  conditionally  generous  by  rewarding  generous  wages  with  generous  effort.    We 
conjecture that perhaps being in the Decider role and being given the responsibility of making 
the final decision is more likely to arouse reciprocal preferences.  Charness (2004) points out 
that  the  gift-exchange  model  can  embody  both  distributional  and  reciprocal  preferences, 
although it has the drawback of not making it possible to disentangle the two due to the 
multiplicative nature of the managerial pay function.  That said, the behavior of Proposers 
more  closely  reflects  distributional  social  preferences  given  the  consistent  trend  of  not 
supplying minimum effort.  Deciders, on the other hand, were more likely to punish managers 
for giving low wages and also reward them when they are high.  A plot of the difference 
between effort and proposed effort, shown in Figure 5, demonstrates that a wage of about 40 
is where reciprocal preferences appear to switch from eliciting negative to positive reactions.  
The question remains though as to exactly how Deciders are being influenced by Proposers.   
One possibility for future research is to investigate how expectations of pro-social behavior by 
others influences a person’s propensity to be generous.   
We now turn to the team treatment BG where both team members have equal decision 
making authority.  Recall that in this treatment, both team members are free to make offers 
whenever and as often as they want within the 3 minute time limit.  A subject can accept a   23
proposal by her teammate at anytime and can make a counter-proposal at any time during this 
stage.  Note from Table 2 that the estimate of θ  in this treatment is -0.004 and significantly 
different  from  zero  at  the  10%  level  of  significance  (p=  0.08).    Thus,  there  is  tentative 
evidence  that  gift  exchange  decreased  under  this  treatment.    The  estimated  level  of  gift 
exchange exhibited by BG employee teams is 0.0065 and significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level of significance.  This level of gift exchange is 35% lower than that exhibited by 
individuals in treatment IN and is in stark contrast to the level of gift exchange observed in 
AC, which was  50% higher than for individuals.   
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  computerized  communication  mechanism  used  in  this 
treatment makes it possible to track negotiations making it possible to potentially understand 
how decisions are reached.  There does not appear to be a tendency for negotiations to move 
effort decisions up or down.  The average first effort offer was 0.23, which is nearly identical 
to that for final effort (0.22).  Within team analysis also does not reveal a directional drift.  An 
interesting trend appears though when considering how much back and forth was required 
between team members to reach a decision that helps in revealing a connection between the 
nature of team interactions and group preferences.  In 20% of the teams the first offer was 
accepted.  The mode for number of offers was 2, which occurred 44% of the time.  The 
remaining 36% were spread between 3 and 14 offers.  A positive relationship exists between 
the number of offers and effort.  The mean effort for 1, 2, and  ≥3 offers was 0.12, 0.2, and 
0.27, respectively
18.  One possible driver of this result is that teams that were given low wages 
agreed without controversy to reciprocate with low effort.  For one offer teams the mean wage 
                                                 
18 There is a clear delineation in the sample at wages around 38.  Only one team assigned a wage below this took 
more than two offers.  On the other hand, about half of the teams assigned a wage in the high 30’s and above 
required 3 or more offers.  There is no strong theoretical justification for the breaking point to occur at this wage 
point.  It could simply be that many subjects perceive wages in the high 30’s and above to be ‘fair’.     24
and effort were 28 and 0.12, respectively.  The average wage for two offer teams was 38, 
while it was 50 for teams requiring 3 or more offers.  This trend is interesting relative to 
Luhan et al. (2007) who found that selfish types were more active and forceful in attempting 
to get the group to maximize their own pay.  If this were true here it would seem likely that 
groups with more contentious negotiations would eventually agree to a lower effort level.  
The opposite appears to be true.  This raises some potentially interesting questions about 
heterogeneity among other-regarding types.  It could be that while one group are willing to 
undergo a cost in terms of negotiations to avoid a selfish action, a different portion of this 
subset is not willing to go through a difficult negotiation once they see that their teammate 
prefers not to sacrifice. 
 
III.  Discussion and Summary 
We use a gift exchange game to compare other-regarding behavior exhibited by teams versus 
individuals.  Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the level of gift exchange 
exhibited  by  teams  can  differ  from  individuals,  but  the  magnitude  and  direction  of  the 
deviation depends on the procedures that govern interactions among teammates in the team 
treatments.  In our AN team treatment, where there is no interaction among teammates and 
one member of the team is chosen to be the decision maker while her teammate observes 
passively,  there  appears  to  be  very  little  behavioral  difference  between  groups  and 
individuals.  Thus, our first observation is that the random assignment of subjects to teams 
does not appear to form group ties that are strong enough to influence gift exchange.   
However,  in  our  other  team  treatments,  we  observed  substantial  deviation  from 
individual behavior.  In our AC treatment, one team member is assigned the role of “Decider”   25
while the other is the “Proposer”.  The Decider makes the ultimate decision for the team but 
before  choosing  effort,  receives  a  recommended  effort  level  from  the  Proposer.      In  this 
treatment,  we  observed  significantly  more  gift  exchange  for  teams  than  individuals.    In 
contrast, in our BG team treatment where both team members have equal decision making 
authority and come to a team decision through multiple effort proposals to each other until a 
consensus  is  reached,  we  observed  significantly  less  gift  exchange  for  teams  relative  to 
individuals.    
It is interesting to note that one of the fundamental differences between the AC and 
BG team treatments is that, in AC, there is only one way communication of a teammate’s 
expectations  via  the  Proposer’s  preferred  effort.    In  contrast,  in  BG,  both  teammates 
communicate their preferred effort and as often as they wish.   Thus, in AC, the Decider 
receives one signal from a teammate and then must act on the basis of that signal.  In BG, 
there  is  much  richer  sharing  of  information  as  the  parties  can  propose  and  veto  multiple 
counter-proposals.  These differences in communication structures raise some puzzles that 
might be interesting topics of investigation for future research.  First, might a procedure that 
allows for richer sharing of information permit the team to ultimately make more rational 
decisions that benefit the team at the expense of outsiders?  Might this drive the lower level of 
gift exchange in BG?  Second, it is not clear how procedures for communication might affect 
perceptions of social expectations among teammates.  Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006) have 
shown that other-regarding behavior in dictator games is non-trivially influenced by social 
expectations and pro-social norms.  Some of what appears to be other regarding behavior by 
DCD’s dictators may simply be attempts to  conform to social expectations.    In our AC 
experiments, our Proposers were quite  generous in their effort proposals much like many   26
dictators in dictator games.  The generous effort proposals may generate social expectations 
that wield a powerful influence on the Deciders.  Our data indicates that Deciders did choose 
effort levels that are fairly close to the effort proposals of Proposers.  Thus, there appears to 
be some evidence of pro-social conformity.  In BG, social expectations are endogenous and 
can evolve through the negotiation process before the team acts. It is not clear to us at this 
point whether this difference in social expectation formation might explain the differences in 
observed  gift  exchange.    It  would  be  interesting  to  explore  the  formation  of  social 
expectations further and to examine how these expectations interact with social preferences.   
Answers  to  these  questions  might  aid  in  the  design  of  optimal  team  and  organizational 
structures that facilitate the achievement of team objectives.   
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   Pooled  IN  BG  AC  AN  Period Mean 
Period  Effort  Wage  Effort  Wage  Effort  Wage  Effort  Wage  Effort  Wage  Effort  Wage 
1  0.35  45  0.27  41.7  0.38  53.2  0.47  44.7  0.37  39.4  0.35  45 
2  0.25  42  0.26  38.9  0.23  49.1  0.32  37.2  0.2  39.4  0.24  42 
3  0.26  41  0.24  43.1  0.18  38.7  0.43  42.2  0.2  36.8  0.26  40 
4  0.22  32  0.17  25.1  0.17  33.2  0.36  44.9  0.24  31.1  0.23  34 
5  0.21  30  0.21  27.4  0.17  30.6  0.23  42.2  0.19  20.7  0.22  30 
Treatment 
Mean  0.25  38  0.23  35  0.22  41  0.36  42  0.24  33       
% Effort = 
0.1 (min)        56     58     31     58          














  AN vs. IN  AC vs. IN  BG vs. IN 
Constant  -0.203  -0.192  -0.06 
  (0.122)  (0.115)  (0.13) 
Wage  0.01***  0.01***  0.01*** 
  (0.002)  (0.0014)  (0.002) 
TD  -0.093  -0.03  0.094 
  (0.148)  (0.157)  (0.124) 
Wage*TD  -0.0015  0.005**  -0.004* 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Period  -0.173**  -0.023  -0.25*** 
  (0.086)  (0.065)  (0.072) 
PeriodSq  0.028**  0  0.041** 
  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Sum of Wage and 
Wage*TD 
0.009***  0.015***  0.0065*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.  
Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.    Treatment  abbreviations  are  IN=Individual, 
BG=Bilateral  Groups,  AC=Asymmetric  Communication,  and  AN=Asymmetric  No 
Communication.  TD represents the treatment dummy. 
Table 2.  Random Effects Censored Regression Comparing Gift-Exchange in Each 

































































































































































































Figure 5.  Plot of the Difference Between Effort and Proposed Effort for the Treatment 
AC Sample.   